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Abstract
This Note analyzes the major substantive distinctions between WARN and the Directive and
recommends that the United States supplement its legislation to raise it to the level of its Euro-
pean counterpart. Part I discusses the history leading to the adoption of the Directive, as well as
the structure and scope of its various articles, and reviews the case law interpreting the Directive.
Part II describes the economic background that prompted the passage of WARN. It then details
the relevant sections of WARN and illustrates how U.S. courts have interpreted these sections.
Part III compares the effectiveness of the two pieces of legislation within their respective soci-
eties. This Note concludes that WARN, unlike the Directive, inadequately protects employees
from unannounced mass dismissals.
NOTE
THE SCOPE OF ASSISTANCE FOR DISLOCATED
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: WARN AND
DIRECTIVE 75/129
COMPARED
INTRODUCTION
Unemployment and lack ofjob security are problems with
which both the United States and the European Community
(the "EC" or the "Community")' have struggled.2 In 1975,
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty].
2. See COMMISSION THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNI-
TIES 314, 317 (1969) [hereinafter THIRD GENERAL REPORT]. In 1973, the Euro-
pean Community [hereinafter EC or the Community] experienced 2.7 percent unem-
ployment. JEAN ROSE SKINNER, EUROPE'S JOBLESS: No END IN SIGHT?, reprinted in 123
CONG. REC. 26,099 (1977). In the trough of the recession of 1975, unemployment
soared to 5.2 percent. Id. The economic recovery of the following year provided no
relief in unemployment, which rose slightly to 5.3 percent. d. By the end of 1977, it
was estimated that 6,000,000 people would be out of work. Id. The heads of the
various Member States convened in Paris to discuss ways to resolve the problem. See
COMMISSION SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 234 (1973) [hereinafter SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT]. They con-
cluded that improving the quality of life and the standard of living was the desired
goal, and that economic expansion of the Community as a whole, rather than expan-
sion of the economies of the individual Member States, was the desired remedy, as
unemployment had become a Community-level problem. Id. 236. Thus, the heads
of state asked the Community institutions to devise a social program that would fur-
ther these goals. Id. 234. The Directive on Collective Redundancies [hereinafter
the Directive] formed part of this program. Id.; see Council Directive No. 75/129,
OJ. L 48/29 (1975)
The United States began its continual struggle with unemployment in the period
between the Korean War and the mid-1960s. GORDON F. BLOOM & HERBERT R. NOR-
THRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 813 (9th ed. 1982). During this period, the
United States was plagued with an unemployment rate in excess of 5 percent, rising
as high as 7 percent during recessionary periods. Id. Unemployment dropped to a
low 4 percent in 1965, and remained around that level for several years. Id. The
recession of 1975 had a more severe effect on the United States than it did on Eu-
rope. The unemployment rate in the United States had risen to 8.2 percent. HEAR-
ING BEFORE THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITrEE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975) (state-
ment of Glenn E. Watts informing Committee that official unemployment rate of 8.2
percent failed to accurately reflect "catastrophic unemployment problem"). The re-
cession subsided after 1975, and the United States enjoyed a temporary period of
business expansion. HEARING BEFORE THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITrEE, 97th Cong.,
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the EC attempted to alleviate this problem by issuing the
Council Directive of 17 February 1975 on the Approximation
of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Collective Re-
dundancies (the "Directive").3 The Directive requires that
management announce a mass dismissal at least thirty days
before carrying it out. This thirty day period provides time for
labor and management to discuss the feasibility of avoiding the
dismissal. If the dismissal cannot be avoided, they must dis-
cuss ways of mitigating its effects.4 Through this notification
procedure, the EC sought to enhance the participation of labor
in decision making, thereby increasing job security. 5
Thirteen years later, the U.S. Congress passed similar leg-
islation, known as the Worker Adjustment and Retraining No-
tification Act ("WARN"). 6 Like the Directive, WARN provides
a mandatory notice period prior to the effectuation of a mass
dismissal or plant closing. 7 Congress hoped that this notice
period would alleviate the effect of an unannounced dismissal,
thereby giving workers time to adjust and seek alternate em-
ployment.8
This Note analyzes the major substantive distinctions be-
tween WARN and the Directive and recommends that the
United States supplement its legislation to raise it to the level
of its European counterpart. Part I discusses the history lead-
ing to the adoption of the Directive, as well as the structure
and scope of its various articles, and reviews the case law inter-
preting the Directive. Part II describes the economic back-
2d Sess. 4 (1982) (statement of Hon. Martin Feldstein). This period of expansion
lasted until 1980. Id. By 1980, the unemployment rate had dropped to 6.3 percent.
Id. This low unemployment rate was short lived, however, and by 1982 it soared to
10.8 percent. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Reuss, Chairman). Whereas the EC passed
the Directive in the midst of the first major post-war recession, it was not until 1988
that Congress passed similar legislation known as the Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988) [hereinafter WARN].
WARN requires employers to notify their employees at least sixty days prior to either
closing the business or effectuating a mass dismissal. Id. § 2102(a). Congress in-
tended that the notice period of WARN absorb the shock of an abrupt dismissal. 134
CONG. REC. 8903 (1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
3. Council Directive No. 75/129, OJ. L 48/29 (1975).
4. Id., pmbl., at 29.
5. Social Action Program, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3164.07, at 3164 (1978).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
7. Id. § 2102(a).
8. 134 CONG. REC. 8903 (1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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ground that prompted the passage of WARN. It then details
the relevant sections of WARN and illustrates how U.S. courts
have interpreted these sections. Part III compares the effec-
tiveness of the two pieces of legislation within their respective
societies. This Note concludes that WARN, unlike the Direc-
tive, inadequately protects employees from unannounced mass
dismissals.
I. THE EUROPEAN SOLUTION TO DISRUPTION OF THE
WORK FORCE DUE TO MASS DISMISSALS
A. Economic History Leading to the Proposal of the Directive
The post World War II era was a period of vast recovery
for the war-torn European economies. 9 With economic aid
from the United States,'" the European countries devoted their
reconstruction efforts toward a relatively unexplored economic
sector: industrialization. The result of this industrial revolu-
tion was an overwhelming increase in European gross domes-
tic product. It
9. See generally HADLEY ARKES, BUREAUCRACY, THE MARSHALL PLAN AND THE NA-
TIONAL INTEREST 24 (1972).
10. Id. at 48. The year 1947 marked the commencement of U.S. aid to Euro-
pean reconstruction by means of the Marshall Plan. Id. The Marshall Plan, proposed
by then Secretary of State George Marshall, was the method by which President
Harry S. Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson hoped to restore and maintain
world stability through the economic recovery of Europe. Id. at 24-26. Essential to
the recovery of Europe was the economic recovery of Germany, as Germany was the
major pre-war supplier of industrial goods. Id. at 26, 47. Thus, Secretary of State
Marshall developed a plan involving the liberal removal of reparations and the provi-
sion of money and resources Europe needed to recover from World War II. Id. at 34,
49; see PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 435 (Vintage Books
1989). The former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, however, continued its policy
of imposing heavy war reparations on the Eastern European countries, especially
East Germany. ARKES, supra note 9, at 57-58. This activity generated a fear of Soviet
military capabilities throughout Western Europe. Id. Thus, to ensure that the Euro-
pean nations used the U.S. funding to rebuild economically rather than militarily, the
United States also supported the rebuilding European nations by providing them
with military defense. KENNEDY, supra, at 422.
11. KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 422. Between 1950 and 1970, the Gross Domes-
tic Product of Europe grew approximately 5.5 percent per annum and 4.4 percent
per capita, compared with the world averages of 5 percent and 3 percent, respec-
tively. Id. at 421.
Every European nation experienced growth to some degree. Id. at 421-28. The
German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) was the primary example. Id. at 425.
After the war Germany was divided, and its military machine dismantled. Id. Thus,
the German population was able to shift the use of its vast internal resources from
1991-1992] WARN AND DIRECTIVE 75/129
Notwithstanding the overall increase in output, this era of
prosperity adversely affected the working class. The moderni-
zation of industry in Europe caused a general shift in European
social structure, as the modernized plants drew agrarian work-
ers into the cities in search of better paying work. At the same
time, however, outdated plants were shut down and replaced
with more efficient factories. Thus, a substantial portion of the
working class already employed in industry found their serv-
ices no longer needed.1 2 As a result of these two phenomena,
unemployment increased sharply.
By 1967, the readaption of the agrarian workers to the ur-
ban environment and the retraining of those who were dis-
placed due to modernization had necessarily become a priority
of EC social policy.' 3 With the dual aim of enhancing employ-
ment opportunities and aiding those making a transition from
rural to urban life, the EC fortified the fund previously devel-
oped for helping the Member States finance the retraining and
military to commercial use. Id. Italy also enjoyed vast industrial growth, notwith-
standing the fact that it began its recovery from an economic position far worse than
that of the other European nations. Id. at 422-23.
France and the United Kingdom did not fare as well. The U.K.'s growth rate was
probably the lowest in Europe, but overall it was better than the figures of the previ-
ous decades. Id. at 424-25. The United Kingdom hoped its 1971 accession to the
Community would provide a much needed economic impetus. Id. Rather, the
United Kingdom found itself exposed to both the expensive agricultural price poli-
cies of the Community and the fierce manufacturing competition of the other Mem-
ber States. Id. France, while struggling with small, undercapitalized manufacturing
processes and small-hold farms, still managed to capture 4 percent of the world gross
national product. Id. at 427-28. However, modern industrialization of manufactur-
ing processes led to violent outbursts of discontent from the working class who found
themselves out of work. Id. at 427. While this political unrest was brewing, however,
France regained international political power. Id. at 428. This power allowed the
French government to persuade the EC to adopt positions favorable to Paris. Id.
12. See THIRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, 326. As the modernization of
Europe progressed, workers had to readapt to their new social situation. CoMMIs-
SION FOURTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITIES 131-34
(1970) [hereinafter FOURTH GENERAL REPORT]. The workers of the coal and steel
industries suffered the greatest displacement, although the industrial redevelopment
had a great effect in all sectors. Id.
13. See generally THIRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, 7 314-30. Many other
aspects of employment policy had become an integral part of the social policy of the
EC. The need for improving relations between management and labor was recog-
nized as a priority. See SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, 247. Equal pay for
men and women, employing the youth of the EC, and the need for vocational train-
ing also enjoyed a position of priority. See COMMISSION EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 226, 242-243 (1974) [hereinafter EIGHTH GENERAL
REPORT].
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readaption of workers. 14 Originally, this "Social Fund" pro-
vided the Member States with one half of the funds necessary
to provide their unemployed workers with vocational training,
resettlement allowances, and unemployment benefits. 5 The
Member States were obliged to provide the other half. 6 As
early as 1969, however, the EC found it necessary to restruc-
ture the Social Fund, and hence it abandoned the system of
state contributions.' 7 The newly reformed Social Fund, how-
ever, still proved to be ineffective in controlling unemploy-
ment. Thus, the Commission of the European Communities
14. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 123. Article 123 establishes the Social
Fund for the purpose of "improv[ing] opportunities of employment of workers in the
Common Market and thus contribut[ing] to raising the standard of living." Id. The
aim of the Social Fund is to render the employment of workers easier and to increase
their geographical and occupational mobility. Id.
15. Id. art. 125(1). Article 125(2) sets forth the conditions under which the
Member States may be reimbursed. Id. art. 125(2). Member States may apply for
reimbursements from the Social Fund for vocational training if the workers could
find employment only in a new occupation, and the workers had been productively
employed in the new occupation for six months. d. With respect to assistance to-
ward resettlement allowances, Member States could apply for reimbursement only if
the newly located workers had been in productive employment for six months in
their new place of residence. d. The Social Fund provided unemployment benefits
for workers whose employment was suspended as a result of the conversion (i.e. re-
structuring) of an undertaking. Id. art. 125(1). As was the case with funds for voca-
tional retraining and resettlement aid, the employees had to have been re-employed
in the same undertaking for at least six months. Id. art. 125(2). Further, the govern-
ment of the Member State had to submit a plan for the conversion before it was
undertaken, and the Commission of the European Community must have approved
it. Id.
16. Id. art 125(1).
17. THIRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, $ 324. In 1968, the Social Fund sup-
plied 13,849,037.99 units of account [hereinafter u.a.] to a total of 38,890 workers.
COMMISSION SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITIES 387
(1968). In 1968, the amount of the repayments had nearly doubled: 25,904,347 u.a.,
approximately 23 million u.a. of which went to retraining workers, with the rest de-
voted to readaption. THIRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, $ 323. In 1969 monies
expended rose to 36.5 million u.a. due to the serious disruption in the coal sector;
the need to restructure the fund had become apparent. Id. 324. The repayments
stimulated the economic sectors at a national level. Id. No impact on the economic
and social life at the Community level was felt, however, due to the inherent difficulty
in coordinating these two policies. Id. Both economic and social policies were inde-
pendently guided along lines consonant with the divergent economic and social re-
quirements and priorities of the Community. Id. As a result, the Community de-
cided to allot the total amount available to all the States in the budget, and abandon
the system of Member State contributions to the Social Fund. Id. In 1970, the newly
structured Social Fund allotted 37 million u.a. for distribution, while the total
amount collectively asked for by the Member States totaled 46 million. FOURTH GEN-
ERAL REPORT, supra note 12, 128.
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(the "Commission") drafted the Social Action Programme,' 8 a
plan addressing the needs of the Member States in the area of
employment policy. ' 9
. The Social Action Programme thus became the vehicle
through which the EC promulgated Community-wide stan-
dards with respect to all aspects of employment policy. In the
name of Community solidarity, the Programme required the
Commission to propose, and the Council to adopt, several di-
rectives aimed at harmonizing the anomalous employment
practices of the Member States. 0 The first three directives
formed the core of the new policy of protecting the workplace
rights of employees. These three directives were the Directive,
Council Directive No. 77/187 (the "Business Transfer Direc-
tive"), 2' which protects the continuity of employment when
employers sell or transfer their businesses, and Council Direc-
tive No. 80/987 (the "Insolvency Directive"),22 which ensures
the payment of wages when an employer faces insolvency.
By the unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers, the Di-
rective on Collective Redundancies was the first of the three
directives to become effective. Through its provisions, the Di-
rective harmonized the laws of those Member States that al-
ready had laws relating to collective redundancies, thereby es-
tablishing a Community-wide procedure for providing advance
notice of collective redundancies. As is the case with all direc-
tives, the Member States are free to fashion their national laws
as they see fit as long as the result sought by the directive is
18. See Council Resolution, O.J. C 13/1 (1974) (containing full text of Social
Action Programme as adopted by Council of Ministers).
19. Id. Drafted at the Summit Conference in Paris in 1972, the Social Action
Programme was to be in effect from 1974 until 1976. Id. The immediate objectives
of the Social Action Programme were to aid migrant and handicapped workers, cre-
ate the European General Industrial Safety Committee and the European Founda-
tion, and extend the competence of the Miner's Safety and Health Committee. Id.
The Commission was also required to propose three directives under the Pro-
gramme, one of which was the Directive on Collective Redundancies. Id. The Direc-
tive was proposed in 1972. SixT GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COM-
MUNITIES (1972) (discussing directives required under Social Action Programme).
20. See Council Directive No. 75/129, pmbl., O.J. L 48/29, at 29 (1975).
21. Council Directive No. 77/187, O.J. L 61/26 (1977) [hereinafter Business
Transfer Directive] (concerning safeguarding of employees' rights in event of trans-
fers of undertakings, businesses, or parts of businesses).
22. Council Directive No. 80/987, OJ. L 283/23 (1980) [hereinafter Insolvency
Directive] (concerning protection of employees in event of insolvency of their em-
ployer).
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achieved. 3
B. The Components of the Directive on Collective Redundancies
The Directive consists of three substantive sections. The
first section defines the terms and the scope of the Directive, 24
while the second section establishes the procedure for consul-
tation between management and labor, and notification of the
government labor authority.25 When the management-labor
consultations fail to avoid a collective redundancy, the last sec-
tion of the Directive sets forth the method by which an em-
ployer may effectuate the dismissal.2 6
The Directive's first section defines a collective redun-
dancy in terms of the number of employees dismissed in rela-
tion to the number of employees normally employed at a given
site. The Directive allows each Member State to choose one of
two thresholds. 27 The first threshold operates over a thirty-
day period. Under this option, businesses that employ be-
tween twenty and 100 employees must dismiss at least ten em-
ployees to trigger the Directive. 2s Those that maintain a work
force of 100 to 300 employees must dismiss at least 10 percent
of the employees to trigger the Directive.2 9 Businesses that
employ at least 300 workers trigger the Directive by dismissing
at least thirty workers.3 0 The second, less stringent, option op-
erates over a ninety-day period. Under this option, businesses
that dismiss twenty employees, regardless of the size of their
23. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189. A directive is defined in the Treaty as
"binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and meth-
ods." Id. Where the language of a directive is precise and unambiguous, and the
Member State is not required to take any affirmative action in order to implement it,
the directive is said to have "direct effect." See, e.g., Rutili v. Minister for the Interior,
Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, 1236, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140, 158. In such cases,
the Member States are restricted to the language of the directive. Id.
24. Council Directive No. 75/129, art. 1, Oj. L 48/29, at 29 (1975).
25. Id. arts. 2, 3, at 30.
26. Id. arts. 3, 4, at 30. The last section comprises the Final Provisions, which
are largely administrative. Id. arts. 5-8, at 30. It should be noted that article 5 of the
Directive allows the Member States to adopt measures that are more favorable to
workers than are those required by the Directive. Id. art. 5, at 30.
27. Id. art. 1, at 29.
28. Id. art. l(a)(l).
29. Id. art. l(a)(2).
30. Id. art. l(a)(3).
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labor force, trigger the Directive.3 '
In addition to setting up the two thresholds, the first sec-
tion of the Directive excludes four classes of employees from
its scope. 2 First, the Directive excludes those employees hired
to complete a specific contract and those hired specifically for a
limited period.33 These employees, however, remain within
the scope of the Directive if the dismissal occurs before the
task is completed or before the limited period elapses. 34 Sec-
ond, the Directive excludes employees of public administrative
bodies or establishments governed by public law.35 The third
exclusion encompasses the crews of sea-going vessels. 36
Fourth, the Directive excludes those employees who lose their
jobs due to the closing of the business as the result of a judicial
decision.
Once the employer decides to dismiss a sufficient number
of employees to trigger the Directive, the second section of the
Directive requires management and labor to embark on a de-
tailed consultative process.3 8 Article 2 requires the employer
to provide the representatives of the employees with all rele-
vant information, such as the number of employees that will be
dismissed, the number of workers normally employed, and the
period over which the redundancies will be effected.3 ' The
employer must also supply the representative of the employees
with the reasons, in writing, for the redundancies. 40 The rea-
son for this transfer of information is to aid the representatives
of the employees in making constructive proposals.4 '
In addition to providing this information, employers must
simultaneously notify the government labor authority and
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 1(2).
33. Id. art. 1(2)(a).
34. Id.
35. Id. art l(2)(b).
36. Id. art 1(2)(c).
37. Id. art. 1(2)(d). Bankruptcy is an example of a business closing as the result
of ajudicial decision. Dansk Metalarbejderforbund v. H. Nielsen and Son, Case 284/
83, [1985] E.C.R. 553, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 91, 93.
38. Council Directive No. 75/129, art. 3, OJ. L 48/29, at 30 (1975). "Labor"
usually refers to the representatives of the employees. Id. arts. 2, 3, at 29-30.
39. Id. art. 2(3), at 30.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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meet with the representative of their employees. 42 During the
meeting, labor and management discuss the possibility of
avoiding the dismissal.4 3 If they determine that a dismissal is
the only viable solution, they propose and discuss methods to
minimize the effect of the dismissal on workers. 4 4 The discus-
sion at the meeting may also involve alternatives to dismissal
such as salary freezes or pay cuts, uncompensated overtime, a
reduction in work hours, work-force attrition, or temporary
lay-offs with priority re-hiring.
Where management and labor determine that a collective
redundancy is the only viable alternative, the third section of
the Directive dictates the method by which employers must ef-
fectuate the dismissal. The employers must first submit a de-
tailed written report to the public employment authority.45
Upon receiving the report, the public employment authority
has thirty days to evaluate the severity of the dismissal and to
prepare the Community for the sudden flood of unemployed.46
While waiting for this thirty-day period to expire, employers
may not dismiss any employees.4 7
The thirty-day notice period is somewhat flexible. In
some circumstances, the Member States may permit the public
employment authority to lengthen the period.48 In these
cases, the public employment authority may extend the period
to a maximum of sixty days.49
42. Id. arts. 2(1), 3, at 29.
43. Id. art. 2(2), at 30.
44. Id.
45, Id. art. 3(i). The report must include the reasons for the redundancies, the
number of workers that will be affected, the period over which the redundancies are
to be made, and any other relevant information produced by the meeting between
the employer and the representative of the redundant employees. Id.
46. Id. art. 4(2).
47. Id. art. 4(1). It is conceivable that an employer may notify both the em-
ployee representative and the public authority simultaneously so as to shorten the
total length of time involved in the process.
48. Id. art. 4(l),(3).
49. Id. art. 4(3). Article 4(3) provides that
where the initial period provided for in paragraph 1 is shorter than 60 days,
Member States may grant the competent public authority the power to ex-
tend the initial period to 60 days following notification where the problems
raised by the projected collective redundancies are not likely to be solved
within the initial period.
Id. Article 4(3) goes on to state that the Member States may grant the public employ-
ment authority wider power to extend the period. Id.
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The provisions of the Directive represent the minimum
standards required by the EC. In implementing the Directive,
the Member States are free to impose standards that are more
severe than those required by the Directive.50 Many of the
Member States have done so by lowering the threshold num-
bers or strengthening the notice requirements. 5' The overall
effect has been a level of work-place rights enhanced beyond
that envisioned by the EC.
The Directive contains one significant loophole that has
emerged over the past few years as a result of increased inter-
national corporate restructuring. 52 The Directive does not
provide for the situation where the decision to effectuate a re-
dundancy is made by a controlling parent company or head
50. Council Directive No. 75/129, art. 5, Oj. L 48/29, at 30 (1975). This provi-
sion allows the Member States to adopt legislation more favorable to the employees.
Id.
51. Belgium, for example, defines a collective dismissal as a dismissal of person-
nel for economic or technical reasons involving, over a period of sixty days, a 10
percent reduction in the work force and a minimum of six dismissals in the case of
companies employing between twenty and fifty people. 1 DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE
(CCH) 9-160 (1987). A plant closing is defined as when "a company or division
employing 20 or more persons definitively ceases its principal activity and the
number of employees is reduced to less than one-quarter of the average number of
employees who are employed in the company or division in the preceding calendar
year." Id.
In Germany, employers are obliged to notify the district labor exchange office if
they intend to dismiss, within thirty days, five workers in a plant employing between
twenty and fifty-nine employees, 10 percent of a 6,500 person work force, or more
than twenty-five members of the work force. Id. 35-220. In plants of more than
500, thirty dismissals will trigger the German legislation. Id.
The Netherlands has strong legislation as well. Id. 66-850. Employers in the
Netherlands must notify both the district Labor Bureau and the interested trade
union one month before filing an application for permission to dismiss. Id. This
application provides that trade unions are to be consulted and that the government
must have had a chance to avoid the unemployment. Id. Twenty employees will also
trigger the legislation of the Netherlands. Id.
In Greece, the redundancy law applies to any employer with twenty to fifty em-
ployees who wishes to dismiss more than five during the same month. Id. 42-780.
In a plant with a work force of more than fifty employees, 2 percent to 3 percent of
the total number or more than thirty during the same month will trigger the law. Id.
52. Proposal to Close Loophole in Collective Redundancies Directive, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 6 (Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Proposal to Close Loophole]. In 1988-89, 55 per-
cent of acquisitions were transnational. [New Developments] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 96,085 (Oct. 17, 1991). Forty percent of acquisitions involved undertakings
from two different Member States, and 15 percent involved undertakings from third
countries. Id.
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office as opposed to the employing subsidiary or branch.53 In
such a circumstance, the immediate employer may not have ac-
cess to all of the information that it is required to pass on to
the employees' representatives and the government labor au-
thority. 54
In order to fill this gap, the Commission has proposed an
amendment to the Directive.5 5 This amendment will require
that the procedures of the Directive apply regardless of where
the decision to dismiss was made.56 The remedy, as provided
by the amendment, for failure to fulfill the notification and
consultation procedure is the nullity of the collective redun-
dancy.
The proposed amendment will modify the existing provi-
sions of the Directive in three ways. First, the exception for
collective redundancies that results from a judicial decision will
be eliminated. 58 Second, crews of sea-going vessels will no
longer be excluded from the protection of the Directive.59
Third, establishments that employ fewer than fifty workers will
no longer be required to designate workers' representatives
for the purposes of information and consultation require-
ments.60 Consequently, such establishments will no longer be
obliged to follow the consultation procedure. 6' Finally, the
proposed amendment will allow its provisions to be imple-
mented through collective bargaining agreements.62 This pro-
vision brings the Directive in line with other recently proposed
53. Id.
54. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 75/129
on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Collective Re-
dundancies, pmbl., Oj. C 310/5, at 5-6 (1991) [hereinafter Commission Proposal];
see Proposal to Close Loophole, supra note 52, at 6.
55. Commission Proposal, supra note 54, O.J. C 310/5 (1991).
56. Id. art. 1(4)(4), at 6.
57. Id. Six Member States already allow their courts to declare null and void
collective redundancies that are carried out in violation of the Directive. [New Devel-
opments] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 96,085 (Oct. 17, 1991). These Member
States are Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Id.
58. [New Developments] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 96,085 (Oct. 17, 1991).
The legislation of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom already contain such a provision. id.
59. Commission Proposal, supra note 54, art. 1(2), O.J. C 310/5, at 6 (1991).
60. Id. art. 1(4)(5).
61. Id.
62. Id. art. 2(1), at 7.
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directives in the sphere of employment law.63
The purpose of the Directive is to mitigate, and possibly
avoid, dismissals through management-labor negotiations.
Where negotiations result in a dismissal, the notice period not
only gives employees time to adjust but also enables the public
employment authority to implement various assistance pro-
grams. Thus, this process of notification and consultation en-
sures that the interests of the employees will be protected to
the fullest extent possible.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Directive
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity ("EEC Treaty") 64 empowers the Court of Justice to inter-
pret both its provisions and the legislation enacted thereun-
der.65 The Court of Justice has interpreted three substantive
issues concerning the Directive. These issues were the scope
of the Directive's exemptions, the status of constructive dismis-
sals, and the duty of an employer to foresee the possibility of a
collective redundancy.66
1. The Exclusivity of the Exemptions Under Article 1(2)
The first issue to come before the Court of Justice related
to the breadth of the four exemptions of the Directive. In
Commission v. Belgium,68 the Court held that Belgian implement-
ing legislation fell short of the requirements of the Directive
because it exempted too many workers. In addition to exclud-
ing port and construction workers,6 9 the Belgian legislation at-
tempted to exclude employees dismissed as the result of a
63. [New Developments] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 96,085 (Oct. 17, 1991).
64. EEC Treaty, supra note 1.
65. Id. art. 164.
66. Although this Note discusses only two of the cases involving the Directive,
there are actually four. The two that will not be discussed involved proceedings con-
cerning the delay of Italy in implementing the Directive, and have no substantive
value for the purposes of this Note. Commission v. Italy, Case 131/84, [1984] E.C.R.
3531, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 693; Commission v. Italy, Case 91/81, [1982] E.C.R. 2133,
[1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 468.
67. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (explaining threshold numbers
required to trigger Directive).
68. Case 215/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1039, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 624.
69. Id. at 1052, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 635.
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plant closing.70
With respect to the port and construction workers,
Belgium claimed that port and construction workers are histor-
ically engaged on a day-to-day basis to perform a specific task,
and thus are necessarily exempt from the scope of the Direc-
tive.7 Because the number of port and construction workers
engaged under indefinite contracts was negligible, Belgium
claimed that the practical effect of their exclusion from the en-
abling legislation would not cause Belgium to fall below the
Community standard.72 The Court of Justice dismissed this
contention, however, holding that the practical effect of the
legislation is irrelevant. 73 The Court stressed that it is possible
for port and construction workers to enter into indefinite con-
tracts. Thus, they are intended to be covered by the Directive,
regardless of how few they may be.74
The Belgian legislation also excluded employees dis-
missed as a result of a plant closing.75 Belgium argued that
most plant closures are the result of judicial decisions, and
thus most of them would be excluded from the protection of
the Directive. 76 Again the Court of Justice disagreed. The Di-
rective, the Court of Justice stated, is intended to protect all
employees who fall within its scope, no matter how few. This
scope includes those employees dismissed as the result of a
plant closing that' was not judicially ordered.77
2. Unilateral Acts by Employees
The second issue to come before the Court of Justice was
the liability of employers under the Directive when their em-
ployees unilaterally terminated their own employment. In
Dansk Metalarbederforbund v. H. Nielsen and Son,78 the employees
70. Id. at 1051, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 633-34.
71. Id.; see Council Directive No. 75/129, art. 1(2)(a), O.J. L 48/29, at 30 (1975).
72. Belgium, [1985] E.C.R. at 1053, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 635-36.
73. Id. at 1054, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 636.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1050, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. at 633.
76. Id. at 1051, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. at 634; see Council Directive No. 75/129, art.
1(2)(d), O.J. L 48/29, at 29 (1975). Article 1(2)(d) of the Directive exempts "workers
affected by the termination of an establishment's activities where that is the result of a
judicial decision." Id.
77. Council Directive No. 75/129, OJ. L 48/29 (1975).
78. Case 284/83, [1985] E.C.R. 553, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 91.
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ceased work after their nearly insolvent employer refused to
guarantee the payment of their wages. 79  The employees'
union subsequently sued the employer, claiming that the fail-
ure to guarantee payment forced the employees to cease work,
and thus the employer had, in effect, dismissed the employ-
ees."° The union charged the employer with liability under the
Directive because the employer failed to satisfy the Directive's
procedural requirements prior to effectuating the "construc-
tive dismissal."8 ' The Court of Justice rejected the union's
claim, stressing that the purpose of the Directive is to minimize
or avoid mass dismissals through utilization of the consultative
procedure.82 To allow employees to terminate their employ-
ment unilaterally, even when they fear nonpayment of their
wages, would deprive employers of their discretion as to when
to apply the collective redundancy procedures, and thereby
undermine the purpose of the Directive."
3. Unilateral Acts by the Employers
The last issue, also addressed in Dansk, was the duty of
employers to foresee the possibility of dismissals.8 4 In consid-
ering whether employers have such a duty, the Advocate Gen-
eral pointed out that to require employers to foresee a collec-
tive redundancy would endanger employment rather than pro-
tect it, as such a requirement would compel employers to
contemplate collective redundancies while at the same time
79. Id. at 561, [19861 1 C.M.L.R. at 97.
80. Id., [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 98.
81. Id. at 562, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 98.
82. Id., [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 99. The Advocate General expressed the objective
of the Directive as protecting employees against a unilateral attack made by their
employer. The Advocate General stated that "[t]he directive does not have the ob-
jective of guaranteeing a form of social security for workers whose employer en-
counters financial difficulties, but seeks ... to strengthen the protection of the worker
against unilateral acts by the employer in the form of collective redundancies." Id. at
556, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 94.
83. Id. at 563, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 99. The Court ofJustice based its holding in
light of the Directive's objective, which is to protect the employee from redundancies
actually contemplated by employers. Id. The Court held that to allow constructive
termination to trigger the Directive, then, would undermine this objective as such an
action would allow the employees to effect collective redundancies against the inten-
tion of their employers. Id. This would actually allow the employees to create the
conditions that give rise to compensation, the Court continued, as a constructive dis-
missal would undercut the ability of employers to utilize the consultative process. Id.
84. Id.
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trying to overcome financial difficulties.85
The Court of Justice took a more pragmatic view. Once
again strictly construing the language of the Directive, the
Court refused to recognize a duty on the employer to foresee a
collective redundancy.86 Instead, the Court held that employ-
ers must actually contemplate collective redundancies before
they will be held to the provisions of the Directive.87 In so
holding, the Court stressed that the interpretation requested
by the employees in Dansk would run afoul of article 1(2) of the
Directive, as that article excludes collective redundancies that
result from termination due to judicial decisions.88 In more
general terms, the Court explained that because the Directive
does not expressly list situations in which employers must
"contemplate" a collective redundancy, there can be no im-
plied obligation to foresee one.89
These cases demonstrate that the objective and plain
meaning of the Directive's language govern the Court's inter-
pretation. 90 The Court of Justice has consistently construed
the language of the Directive narrowly so as to conform its lan-
guage to its objective of protecting employees from the inequi-
table actions of their employers. In this context, only those
employers who affirmatively dismiss employees will be held to
the requirements of the Directive. Circumstances beyond the
employer's control that result in dismissal, such as bankruptcy
or a strike, cannot bind the employer to the terms of the Direc-
tive.
II. THE WARN ACT
In 1988, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation with char-
acteristics similar to those of the Directive: WARN. Like the
Directive, WARN requires employers to notify their employees
and the local government prior to effectuating a dismissal. Un-
like the Directive, however, WARN does not require negotia-
85. Id. at 557, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 96.
86. Id. at 563, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 99.
87. Id., [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 100.
88. Id. at 564, [1986] C.M.L.R. at 100.
89. Id., [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 99-100.
90. Id. In Dansk, the Court of Justice looked specifically at the language of the
Directive, and interpreted it literally, in light of the objective of the Directive. Id. at
563, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 99.
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tions between labor and management in addition to notice.
Due largely to this difference and the judicial interpretation of
the U.S. statute, WARN has a quite different impact on the U.S.
work force than the Directive does on the European work
force.
A. Conditions Preceding the Passage of WARN
1. Economic Factors Leading to the Passage of WARN
At the conclusion of World War II, the United States led
the world in economic production.9' This economic prosper-
ity, however, soon dissipated as a result of two antagonistic
forces: the increase in industrial productivity of modem Eu-
rope and the general shift of the U.S. work force away from
industrial jobs to the personal services sector.9 2 By 1960, the
U.S. economy felt the short term repercussion of its shifting
work force-the decline of research and development as com-
pared to other countries.93 As a result, competition with non-
U.S. goods became increasingly difficult, causing higher than
average inflation.94 This inability of the United States to com-
pete laid the foundation for the development of longer term
effects, such as decreasing productivity and an increasing fed-
eral deficit.9 5
By the late 1970s, the U.S. economy felt the long term
repercussions of the shifting work force. In the period be-
tween 1978 and 1982, productivity growth fell dramatically.9 6
As a result, the United States found it increasingly difficult to
compete in the international market,9 7 leading to a further de-
91. KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 432.
92. Id. at 433. In addition to the shift away from mass production to less pro-
ductive personal services, other downward U.S. economic trends were present, such
as fiscal and taxation policies that encouraged high consumption but also a low per-
sonal savings rate, a decrease in research and development, and the devotion of a
large proportion of the national product to defense expenditures. Id. These contrib-
uted to the decline of U.S. prosperity. Id.
93. See id. (discussing decline of U.S. research and development).
94. Id. at 434. Other factors were present that fostered high inflation. Id. at
433-34. These factors included a surge of investment in Europe, a further increase in
overseas military spending, and the increasing inability of the United States to com-
pete industrially with other nations. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 434. Productivity growth fell from 2.4 percent to 0.2 percent. Id.
97. Id. at 435.
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cline in the U.S. per capita gross national product.98 Finally,
by the late 1980s, the large plants of the Midwest had laid-off
thousands of workers without warning.99
2. The Legislative Debates
In 1973, the Senate first considered legislation requiring
employers to give notice prior to mass dismissals.10 0 Through-
out the next. fifteen years, Congress heatedly debated the
terms of legislation aimed at requiring notification prior to a
plant closure or a mass dismissal.' 0 ' The opponents of ad-
vance notice argued that it was a radical idea that would strike
at the very heart of the free enterprise system. 0 2 They also
harbored concerns that advance notice would be detrimental
to foreign trade.' 0 Proponents, on the other hand, stressed
that the issue was one of human decency, 10 4 and noted that
most U.S. competitors already required advance notice.
98. Id.
99. See 134 CONG. REc. 8903 (1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum informing
Senate of recent plant closings in Michigan and Ohio).
100. 119 CONG. REC. 41,364 (1973). Senator Walter Mondale proposed bill
S2809, which purported to amend the Manpower Development and Training Act. Id.
The amendment would have not only required notice of a plant closing, but also
other assistance including retraining. Id. Further, the amendment would have pre-
vented federal support for unjustified dislocations. Id. The same legislation was pro-
posed to the House of Representatives in 1974. 120 CONG. REC. 17,586 (1974)
(statement of Rep. Patten introducing the same amendment).
101. Advance notice legislation has consistently arisen in Congress since that
time. 125 CONG. REC. 21,679 (1979) (statement of Rep. William Ford introducing
H.R. 5040 that required notice to Secretary of Labor, labor organizations that are
affected, and employees and local government); 129 CONG. REC. 10,576 (1983)
(statement of Rep. William Ford introducing H.R. 2847 as National Employment Pri-
orities Act); 131 CONG. REc. 5920 (1985) (introducing plant closing bill as Labor-
Management Notification and Consultation Act); 133 CONG. REc. 2231 (1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Metzenbaum introducing S. 538-Economic Dislocation and Worker
Adjustment Assistance Act). WARN was then introduced as part of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987. See 133 CONG. REC. 17,849 (1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Bonior).
102. 134 CONG. REC. 8618 (1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
103. Id. at 15,782. Senator Symms expressed concern that advance notice "will
increase labor market rigidity" and "reduce management flexibility." This would, in
turn, "increase labor costs and thus productivity costs, and therefore encourage off-
shore sourcing of the products [plants] produce." Id. Senator Symms queried "how
in the world does [advance notice] help this economy of ours if we do things which
make it harder to do business in the United States." Id.
104. Id. at 8903. Sen. Metzenbaum urged the adoption of WARN by asking,
"What happens to these hard working, dedicated Americans and their communities
when an employer suddenly pulls the plug? How do they begin to pick up the
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Finally, after failing to override President Reagan's veto,
Congress enacted WARN in 1988 without his signature." '0
Through WARN, Congress intended to establish a mandatory
notice provision that would provide a transition period during
which soon to be dismissed employees could seek alternate
employment or retraining. 10 6 The period was also intended to
provide time for the state dislocated worker unit to prepare
itself for the influx of unemployed.10 7
B. Notice-The Essence of WARN
WARN sets out the procedure that employers must follow
prior to executing a mass dismissal or plant closing.'08 The
three substantive sections of WARN' 0 9 include its definitions
and their scope," t0 the required notice procedure,"' and the
pieces?... The advance notice requirement will not end the tragedy of plant closing.
But it will act as a shock absorber." Id.
105. President's Message to Congress on Veto of H.R. 3 or the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act, id. at 12,130 (1988). President Reagan vetoed the entire
trade bill because of his opposition to the advanced notice provision. Id. The House
overrode the veto, but the Senate sustained it. Id. at 12,152-53; id. at 13,716. The
advance notice provision was then severed from the Omnibus Trade Act and reintro-
duced. See 133 CONG. REC. 17,849 (1987) (statement of Rep. Bonior speaking on
behalf of S. 2527 Plant Closing Notification Act). President Reagan did not veto the
bill, but refused to sign it. Thus, WARN became law without his signature. 24
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 990 (Aug. 8, 1988). For a comprehensive discussion of
the history of WARN, see Christopher Yost, WARN: Advance Notice Required?, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1989).
106. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1991); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078. The House Conference noted that
advance notice is an essential component of a successful worker adjustment program.
Id. It also indicated that WARN and the Economic Dislocated Worker Assistance Act
[hereinafter EDWAA] are intended to be closely intertwined so as to create a pro-
gram of dislocated worker assistance. Id.; see infra notes 239-44 (discussing EDWAA).
107. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1 (1991).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988).
109. Id. The remaining sections deal with administrative matters. Section 2105
states that WARN does not preempt other statutory or contractual rights and reme-
dies of employees. Id. § 2105. Section 2106 encourages employers to take action
even where they are not statutorily required to do so. Id. § 2106. Section 2107
grants the Department of Labor authority to prescribe regulations regarding WARN.
Id. § 2107. Section 2108 explains the effect of WARN on other laws. Id. § 2108.
Lastly, § 2109 requires the Comptroller General to submit to the Committee on
Small Business of both the House and the Senate, the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, and the Committee on Education and Labor a report on employ-
ment and international competitiveness, analyzing the costs and benefits of WARN.
Id. § 2109. To date, this report has not been completed.
110. Id. §§ 2101, 2103.
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remedy to which affected employees are entitled."t 2
WARN applies only to those businesses that employ 100
or more employees. Excluded from this threshold are tempo-
rary employees, 13 defined as those who are either hired with
the understanding that their employment is only for the dura-
tion of a particular project, or those who are hired to operate a
temporary facility.' "4 Thus, the definition necessarily excludes
seasonal workers as well."I Also outside the reach of WARN
are employees out of work due to a strike or lock-out. 1 6 Fur-
ther, employees who are permanently replaced because of par-
ticipation in an economic strike are not included in compiling
the threshold. 117
Employers must dismiss a statutory number of the em-
ployees included in this threshold to have effectuated a "mass
dismissal" under WARN." 8 Like the Directive, WARN defines
this statutory number in terms of the number of employees
dismissed over a thirty-day period in relation to the number of
employees usually employed at a given site.' '9 To execute a
mass dismissal, an employer 20 must permanently dismiss at
least fifty employees at one site. 12  In the alternative, the em-
ployer must temporarily dismiss either 500 total or 33 percent
of all employees. 122
Employers are thus not required to give notice at all un-
less the statutory minimum number of employees will experi-
ence an "employment loss."' 23 The term "employment loss"
excludes many types of employees. Employees whose employ-
111. Id. § 2102.
112. Id. § 2104.
113. Id. § 2103(1).
114. Id.
115. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(h) (1991).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2) (1988).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 2101(a)(3).
119. Id. § 2101.
120. An "employer" is defined by WARN as one who employs 100 or more em-
ployees excluding part time workers, or 100 or more who work more than forty hours
per week in the aggregate. Id. § 2101(1)(a).
121. Id. § 2101(a)(2). This threshold cannot include part-time employees. Id.
§ 2101(a)(3)(B)(i).
122. Id. § 2101(a)(3)(i)-(ii). Where the 33 percent provision applies, 33 percent
of the work force must total at least fifty employees in order for WARN to apply. Id.
123. Id. Section 2101 (a)(6) defines "employment loss" as "(A) an employment
termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement,
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ers have offered them work at different sites, provided the new
sites are within reasonable commuting distance, do not experi-
ence an employment loss under WARN. 124 Also excluded are
employees who accept such offers notwithstanding the fact that
the new sites are not within a reasonable distance. 125 Both of
these exclusions are conditioned upon the fact that the transfer
will not disrupt employment for more than six months.' 2 6
Once employers have decided to dismiss a sufficient
number of employees, the second substantive section of
WARN comes into play. This section requires employers to
notify their employees. Employers are also required to notify
both the state dislocated worker unit' 27 and local government
of the pending dismissal at least sixty days prior to the execu-
tion of the plant closure or dismissal.' 21
This notice period is somewhat flexible. 12 9  Employers
may reduce the notice period to "as much notice as is practica-
ble" in three circumstances."30 Under the faltering company
exception,' 3' employers who actively seek capital to avoid a
closing or lay-off may shorten the period if they have a good
(B) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a reduction in hours of work of more than 50
percent during each month of any 6-month period." Id.
124. Section 2101(b)(2) states that
[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(6) of this section, an employee may not be
considered to have experienced an employment loss if the closing or layoff
is the result of the relocation or consolidation of part or all of the em-
ployer's business and, prior to the closing or layoff-
(A) the employer offers to transfer the employee to a different site of
employment within a reasonable commuting distance with no more than a 6-
month break in employment.
Id.
125. Id. § 2101(b)(2)(B). Section 2101(b)(2)(B) states that "the employer offers
to transfer the employee to any other site of employment regardless of distance with
no more than a 6-month break in employment, and the employee accepts within 30
days of the offer or of the closing or layoff, whichever is later." Id.
126. Id.
127. The state dislocated worker unit is the unit designated or created through
the auspices of the EDWAA. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2081; see infra notes 239-44 (discussing EDWAA).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1988).
129. Id. § 2102(b).
130. Id. Employers may reduce the notice period to "as much notice as is practi-
cable" when they are actively seeking capital, when they are faced with unforeseen
business circumstances, or when they must close the business as the result of a natu-
ral disaster. Id.
131. Id. § 2102(b)(1).
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faith belief that giving notice would frustrate their efforts.
32
Employers may also reduce the notice period when confronted
with unforeseen business circumstances at the time notice
would normally have been required. 33  Finally, employers
need not give any notice if the mass dismissal or plant closing
is due to a natural disaster and the giving of notice is impracti-
cable. 134
Where the employer fails to give adequate notice, the
third section of WARN provides a remedy for those employees
who have been wrongfully discharged. 35 In essence, employ-
ers are liable for back pay for each day of the violation.'3 6 In
addition, employers are liable for the value of any benefits to
which the employees were entitled while on the job. 3 7 Em-
ployers must also pay a civil fine for failure to notify local offi-
cials. 138
Employers may mitigate their liability in four ways. First,
they may pay the employees their wages during the period of
the violation.'3 9 Second, they may deduct from the initial cal-
culation of sixty days wages, any voluntary and unconditional
payments made to the employees. 140 Third, they may deduct
132. Id.
133. Id. § 2102(b)(2)(A). When confronted with an unforeseen business cir-
cumstance, employers may also extend the duration of a mass layoff beyond the six
month limit provided in section 2101(a)(3). Id. § 2102(c). Employers who invoke
this extension, however, must notify the laid-off employees as soon as it becomes
foreseeable that such an extension will be necessary. Id. § 2101(c)(2).
134. Id. § 2102(b)(2)(B).
135. Id. § 2104.
136. Id. § 2104(a)(1)(A). The amount recoverable is either the average amount
received by the employee over the past three years of employment, or the final regu-
lar rate of pay received by the employee, whichever is greater. Id.
137. Id. § 2104(a)(l)(B). Section 2104(a)(l)(B) provides benefits to which dis-
missed employees are entitled, and includes the value of any benefits under an em-
ployee benefit plan, including any medical benefits incurred during the period of the
violation that would have been covered under the employee benefit plan had the
employee not been dismissed. Id. This liability may be calculated up to a maximum
of sixty days, and may not exceed one-half the number of days of the employment.
Id.; see Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In Finnan,
the court interpreted this provision to require that the benefits to which the employ-
ees were entitled during their employment are to be appraised and the value awarded
to the employees. Id. at 464.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3) (1988). The fine is US$500 per day of the violation.
Id.
139. Id. § 2104(a)(2)(A).
140. Id. § 2104(a)(2)(B).
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any payment made to a third party on behalf of the employee
during the period of the violation.' 4 1 Fourth, they may miti-
gate their liability by demonstrating good faith beliefs that
their actions would not violate WARN.' 42
C. Judicial Interpretation of WARN
Because WARN has been in effect for only a short period
of time, case law interpreting its provisions is sparse. Courts
have, however, interpreted various aspects of the definition of
an "employer" and an "employee" under WARN. They have
reviewed several of the exceptions allowing employers to
shorten the notice period and have reviewed WARN's remedial
provisions. Much of the case law tends to increase workers'
difficulty in successfully seeking relief under WARN.
1. The "Employer"
a. Identifying an "Employer"
Stated simply, WARN requires employers to notify their
employees of anticipated dismissals. 14s In interpreting WARN,
courts have expounded various elements of the definition of an
"employer." In Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees International
Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Associates,'4 4 the court deter-
mined the level of control that a person must exert over a busi-
ness to be deemed the employer.' 45 The court described the
employer as the person responsible for overseeing the daily
operation of the business.' 46 The court held that mere super-
vision of the business activities does not elevate the supervisor
to the level of an employer. 4
7
Another aspect of the statutory definition of an "em-
141. Id. § 2104(a)(2)(C).
142. Id. § 2104(a)(4). The amount of the deduction allowed for a good faith
belief is left to the discretion of the court. Id.
143. Id. § 2102.
144. 724 F. Supp. 333 (D.N.J. 1989).
145. Id. The defendants operated a casino in Atlantic City. Id. at 334. The ca-
sino experienced financial difficulties, and the New Jersey Casino Control Commis-
sion appointed a conservator so that the casino could remain operative. Id. When
the financial problems persisted, the casino was shut down. Id. The issue before the
court was whether the conservator or the casino management was the employer for
the purposes of WARN. Id.
146. Id. at 335.
147. Id. at 336.
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ployer" is the time at which to count the number of employees
a business must employ before it is considered an "employer."
WARN requires that a business employ at least 100 employees
before it is deemed an "employer,"' 4 but it does not specify
whether the employees are to be counted at the time of the
dismissal or at the time notice should have been given. In
United Electrical Workers of America v. Maxim, Inc.,149 the em-
ployer ceased operations without giving adequate notice to its
employees. 50 It argued that on the date of closing, the com-
pany employed only seventy-six employees, and thus WARN
did not apply.' 5 ' In a small victory for labor, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts decided that the
number of employees at the site is to be determined on the day
that notice is first required to be given, not on the day of the
actual closing. 51
b. Effecting a "Mass Dismissal" Under WARN
In addition to detailing the characteristics of an employer,
WARN's definition of "employer" also prescribes the actions a
business must take before it has effected a "mass dismissal."
To effectuate a mass dismissal under WARN, the employer
need only lay-off fifty employees. The courts, however, have
limited the scope of employees eligible to be included in this
group of fifty employees.15 3 In Maxim, for example, the court
limited the ability of employees to aggregate various groups of
employees dismissed at different times.154 The employer had
initially laid-off a number of employees below the WARN
threshold. In a subsequent dismissal, however, the employer
148. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(l) (1988).
149. No. 89-2981, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5988 (D. Mass. May 15, 1990) (grant-
ing writ of attachment).
150. Id. at *5.
151. Id. at *3.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *9; see Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union v. Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc., No. 90 Civ. 2559, 1991 WL 136036 (S.D.N.Y.July 18, 1991). In Sea Land, Judge
Leval held that the employees must be laid off for six months before they can be
considered to have experienced an employment loss. Id. at *4. In granting summary
judgment to defendant Sea Land, he stated further that where employees are laid off,
recalled, and then laid-off again within thirty days, the first lay-off cannot be consid-
ered an employment loss under WARN. d. at *5.
154. United Elec. Workers v. Maxim, No. 89-2981, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5988,
at *8,*9 (D. Mass. May 15, 1990).
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laid-off a number of employees that would in itself have trig-
gered WARN.' 55 The court ruled that because the second lay-
off in itself would have triggered WARN, the two groups of
laid-off employees could not be combined so as to afford statu-
tory protection to the smaller group.'5 6
2. The "Employees"
Just as WARN sets forth the characteristics and actions re-
quired of "employers," so too it limits the categories of work-
ers that qualify as statutory "employees." WARN applies only
to employers with at least 100 employees, but it specifically ex-
empts certain employees from this threshold. The judiciary
has further narrowed the scope of employees entitled to be
counted in computing the threshold.
Part-time employees are specifically excluded from the
scope of WARN. 157 In Solberg v. Inline Corp. ,58 the court de-
fined a "part-time employee" as one who works less than
twenty hours per week or less than six months per year. 159 In
Solberg, the defendant employer hired 300 employees solely for
the purpose of fulfilling a large contract.160  The contract was
canceled and the employer fired those employees.' 6 ' When
the discharged employees brought suit, the court held that for
the purpose of WARN these 300 employees were part-time and
could not be included in computing the WARN threshold.'62
In reaching this conclusion, the court interpreted the language
of the statute literally. 163 The court found that the language of
the statute unambiguously reflected the intent of Congress to
exclude both those employees working fewer than twenty
hours per week and those employed less than six months prior
155. Id. at *7, *8.
156. Id. at *9.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (1988).
158. 740 F. Supp. 680 (D. Minn. 1990).
159. Id. at 685.
160. Id. at 682. Defendant Inline was a packaging company that normally em-
ployed approximately thirty employees. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 685.
163. Id. at 684. The plaintiffs argued for a broader interpretation on the ground
that a literal interpretation would create an unjust result. Id. In the alternative, the
plaintiffs argued for an interpretation that would limit "part-time employees" to sea-
sonal and "true" part-time employees, i.e. those working less than twenty hours per
week. Id.
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to the layoff.' 64 The court did note, however, that part-time
employees are "affected" by mass dismissals and are entitled
to both notice and a remedy. 165 Thus, the decision makes it
more difficult for employees to reach the threshold because the
broadly construed "part-time employees" are excluded in
compiling the 100 employees needed to trigger WARN.
Although they cannot be included in activating WARN, these
excluded employees may seek relief.
Unlike part-time employees, employees who have been
laid off prior to a plant closure may still be included in comput-
ing the WARN threshold if they can show that they have a "rea-
sonable expectation of recall." 166 In Damron v. Rob Fork Mining
Corp. ,167 the court adopted the definition of "reasonable expec-
164. Id. At the urging of the plaintiffs, the court briefly looked into the legisla-
tive history of the definition of "part-time employee." Id. The court examined the
House Conference Committee Report and found that the definition was intended to
encompass two concepts, that of a part-time employee and that of a seasonal em-
ployee. Id. In the Report, part-time employees were defined as those "hired to work
an average of fewer than 15 hours per week." Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1045, 1047, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078, 2080). Sea-
sonal employees, on the other hand, were defined as those "hired for a period not to
exceed 3 months per year." Id. Because the legislators wished to combine both con-
cepts into a single term, the two definitions were combined to form the definition of
"part-time employee," which includes "employees who work fewer than 20 hours per
week or who have worked fewer than 6 months in the 12 month period prior to the
point at which the employer is required to serve notice." Id. From this, the court
concluded that newly hired full-time employees were not intended to be included in
the compilation of the 100 employees needed to trigger WARN. Id. at 685.
165. Id. Under WARN, "affected employees" are those "who may reasonably be
expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant
closing or mass layoff by their employer." 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) (1988). Section
2102(a)(1) requires that notice be provided to "each affected employee." Id.
§ 2102(a)(1). The court thus deducted that the intent of Congress was "to exclude
'part-time' employees from the calculation of a mass lay-off, but not to exclude them
from protection once the lay-off occurs." Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680,
685 (D. Minn. 1990).
166. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1) (1991). WARN itself is silent with respect to what
constitutes a "reasonable expectation of recall." See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
In Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp., 739 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Ky. 1990), aff'd, 945
F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1991), the district court reasoned that employees with a reason-
able expectation of recall nevertheless would be "affected" by a dismissal or plant
closure, and are thus entitled to the protection of WARN. Id. at 343. The Depart-
ment of Labor regulations define "reasonable expectation of recall" as when an em-
ployee understands through notification or industry practice, that his or her employ-
ment has been temporarily interrupted and that he or she will be recalled to the same
or a similar job. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1) (1991).
167. 739 F. Supp. 341.
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tation of recall" used by the National Labor Relations
Board.' 6 8 This definition weighs three criteria: the past expe-
rience of the employer, the employer's future plans, and the
circumstances of the layoff, including the information provided
to the employees.' 69 In Damron, the claimants were employees
in a hiring pool who had been "laid-off" for eight to ten
years.' 70 To attain the requisite number of employees needed
to invoke WARN, these employees claimed that they should be
included in attaining the threshold because they had a reason-
able expectation of being recalled to work.' 7 ' This reasonable
expectation was based on the allegation that the employer
planned to expand its operations and thus was going to recall
approximately sixty employees from the hiring pool. 72 The
court found, however, that because the plaintiffs did not pro-
duce evidence that their employer had definite plans to ex-
pand, their expectation of recall was too speculative to warrant
aid under WARN." 73 The court held that allowing the laid-off
employees to reap the benefits of WARN would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute."74 The court stressed that
these employees did not need the notice period to adjust to
being out of work, as they had been laid-off for a minimum of
eight years."7 5 In effect, then, the court limited how far into
the future plaintiffs may look to find a reasonable expectation
of recall.
3. Reduction of the Notice Period
The courts have reviewed two of the exceptions that allow
employers to reduce the notice period to "as much notice as is
practicable." These are the exception for unforeseen business
circumstances and the faltering company exception. With re-
spect to the former, the court determined the scope of "un-
168. Id. at 344.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 345.
171. Id. at 344.
172. Id. at 343.
173. Id. at 344. Only those plans in the "near and foreseeable future" are to be
examined. Id. (citing Data Technology Corp., 281 N.L.R.B. 1005, 1006 (1986)). The
actual duration of the layoff is considered when evaluating the three criteria, but is
not dispositive. Id. at 345.
174. Id. at 344.
175. Id. at 345.
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foreseeable," while for the latter, the court clarified the mean-
ing of the phrase "actively seeking capital."
a. Unforeseen Business Circumstances
Under WARN, employers facing unforeseeable circum-
stances that adversely affect their businesses are excused from
providing their eniployees with sixty days notice, but only if
such notice would be impracticable or create an undue hard-
ship. 176  Examples of such unforeseeable circumstances in-
clude natural disasters and sudden, dramatic changes in busi-
ness conditions such as cost, price, or declines in customer or-
ders. 7
7
In Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc.,17s the court held that
the business judgment of the employer governs the determina-
tion of whether a business circumstance was reasonably un-
foreseeable. 79 In determining whether the conduct of the em-
ployer was reasonable, the court compared the action taken by
the employer with the action that a reasonably prudent em-
ployer in the same market would have taken.' If the reason-
ably prudent employer would consider a given circumstance
unforeseeable in light of the objective facts, then no notice is
required.' The same standard applies to determine how
much notice is practical under the circumstances. 8 2
176. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (1988).
177. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2082.
178. 748 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Tenn. 1990). The facts of Kayser-Roth are exem-
plary. In Kayser-Roth, Kayser-Roth had a substantial contract withJ.C. Penney to sup-
ply women's hosiery. Id. at 1279. This contract, in fact, was saving Kayser-Roth from
insolvency. Id. J.C. Penney discovered quality problems with the hosiery, and
warned Kayser-Roth that the contract would be canceled if the problems were not
rectified. Id. at 1280-81. The court found that at this point in the negotiations be-
tween Kayser-Roth and J.C. Penney it was reasonable for Kayser-Roth to foresee the
possibility of a plant closure. Id. at 1288.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1285. The court stated that "[t]he test for determining when busi-
ness circumstances are not reasonably foreseeable focuses on an employer's business
judgment. The employer must exercise such commercially reasonable business judg-
ment as would a similarly situated employer in predicting the demands of its particu-
lar market." Id.
181. Id. at 1288. The court found that the defendant's reliance on his own per-
sonal beliefs in light of the totality of the objective factual circumstances was not
commercially reasonable. Id.
182. Id. The court found that because Kayser-Roth knew that it could not keep
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b. The Faltering Company Exception
Employers are also excused from providing the sixty days
notice required by WARN if, at the time the notice would have
been required, they had been actively seeking capital or busi-
ness that would have thwarted the need for a dismissal. In Lo-
cal 397 v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc. ,183 the court established a three
prong test for determining the validity of the invocation of the
faltering company exception. 84 Under this test, employers
must first show the specific steps they have taken to obtain cap-
ital or new business. 8 5 Employers must then show the basis
for their good-faith belief that the notice would have prevented
them from obtaining the needed capital.' 86 To satisfy the third
prong of the court's test, employers must show that they noti-
fied the employees as soon as practicable, and explain why ear-
lier notice was not given.' 87 The court concluded that negotia-
tions for the sale of a business are not equivalent to "actively
seeking capital."' 88 Thus, where the sale will result in a layoff
or closure, notice must be given.' 89
4. Remedies
Courts have also considered the remedial provisions of
WARN. WARN clearly states that its remedies are exclusive, 90
and attempts to expand them to include punitive damages
have proven futile. 19' In Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co. ,192 the
the Harriman plant open, it was reasonable for Kayser-Roth to notify the employees
of the possibility of the plant closing. Id.
183. 763 F. Supp. 78 (D.N.J. 1990) (denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction).
184. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2081-82. The conference report sets forth the same three prong test as
does Midwest Fasteners. Id.; see Midwest Fasteners, 763 F. Supp. at 83-84.
185. Midwest Fasteners, 763 F. Supp. at 83-84.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 84.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b)(1988) (stating that seller is responsible for giv-
ing notice up to date of sale). After the date of the sale, the buyer is responsible for
providing notice of a dismissal or layoff. Id. In addition, any person who is an em-
ployee of the seller on the date of the sale will be considered an employee of the
buyer. Id.
190. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b) (1988).
191. See Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rul-
ing out possibility of punitive damages).
192. Id.
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court pointed out that Congress could have chosen to codify
common law rules that permit punitive damages, but that it
had chosen not to do so.' 9 3 The court concluded that Con-
gress did not intend claimants to receive punitive damages. 94
In Midwest Fasteners, however, the court did not explicitly
exclude the possibility of injunctive relief.' 95 The employees
in Midwest Fasteners sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
their employer from hiding funds from the court that could be
used to pay WARN, damages. 196 The court stated that because
Congress did not expressly limit the injunctive power of the
courts, Congress did not intend to deprive courts of their
power in equity. 197 The court refused to interpret the silence
of Congress as an implication of such an intent.198 In this case,
however, the court applied the traditional test for granting in-
junctive relief and denied the injunction.' 99
The courts have limited the protection of employees
under WARN, thereby making it increasingly difficult for em-
ployees to invoke the protection to which they are statutorily
entitled. Because the scope of WARN is so narrow, it lacks the
force to aid employees adequately in the event of a mass lay-off
or dismissal. When compared to the Directive, the weaknesses
of WARN become more apparent.
III. DIRECTIVE 75/129 AND WARN COMPARED
Despite the striking similarities between WARN and the
Directive, the Directive functions more effectively. The Direc-
tive requires cooperation between labor and management in
exchanging information, and consultation, which may influ-
ence the ultimate decisions of management. Further, the Di-
rective covers a wide spectrum of employees and businesses.
WARN, which in comparison stands virtually alone in the em-
193. Id. at 465.
194. Id.
195. Local 397 v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D.N.J. 1990).
196. Id. at 79.
197. Id. at 81.
198. Id. at 81-82.
199. Id. at 84. The test to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate
under the circumstances involves evaluating the party's likelihood of success on the
merits and balancing the equities. Id. In the balance, the court considers whether
protecting the rights of the plaintiff by granting the injunction outweighs the prejudi-
cial effects of such a grant to the defendant. Id.
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ployment sphere of U.S. social policy, mandates no employee
participation in the decisions of management. Moreover, be-
cause the scope of WARN is so narrow, it covers only a small
percentage of U.S. businesses. In addition, employers can eas-
ily utilize the various exceptions and mitigation provisions to
protect themselves from liability under its provisions.
A. Participation Versus Deterrence
The most notable difference between the Directive and
WARN is the notification procedure each mandates. By requir-
ing a detailed information and consultation procedure, 0 ° the
Directive contributes to management-labor dialogue. During
these consultations, they must discuss either alternatives to the
proposed dismissal or ways to minimize the number of em-
ployees affected. Even where a dismissal is the only reasonable
alternative, employees within the EC can be sure that their in-
terests are considered by management during the decision-
making process. This procedure may contribute to job secur-
ity and at least reduces labor's suspicion of management, thus
eliminating a major source of industrial unrest.20 '
In the United States, however, employees are entitled only
to the sixty-day notice period. WARN requires no employee-
management consultation. When employers violate the sixty-
day notice period, employees may seek the monetary remedy
as statutorily provided. The objective of WARN, then, is
merely to deter employers from abruptly dismissing their em-
ployees rather than directly protecting employees by requiring
their participation in management's decision to dismiss.
The remedial provisions of WARN, however, are not
strong enough to serve as a forceful deterrent. The monetary
damages for which employers are liable are minimal. 20 2 In
many cases, therefore, it may be more cost-effective for em-
ployers to violate WARN and submit to liability than to comply
with the statute. Employers may prefer to pay the lump-sum
remedy of WARN in order to avoid involving the government
in their management decisions. In so doing, employers avoid
200. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing consultation pro-
cedure of Directive).
201. SocialAction Program, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3164.07, at 3164.(1978).
202. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (setting forth pay rates).
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governmental pressure and adverse public opinion while im-
portant decisions are being made. Furthermore, employers
stand a fair chance of escaping liability by alleging that they fall
within the faltering company exception, or that they were com-
pelled to close as the result of unforeseeable business circum-
stances.2 °3 Even where one of the two exceptions does not ap-
ply, employers may substantially mitigate their liability by
utilizing one of the mitigation procedures provided in the re-
medial section of WARN.
20 4
B. The Scope of WARN and the Directive Compared
In addition to the exceptions and mitigation provisions of
WARN, employers may escape liability by claiming that they do
not employ enough employees. The courts have narrowly con-
strued WARN to exempt many employees who might other-
wise be included, such as part-time and temporary workers.
Judicial interpretation of WARN has thus enhanced the diffi-
culty of U.S. workers to compile a sufficient number of employ-
ees to trigger WARN.
The Court of Justice, on the other hand, has consistently
interpreted the Directive in conformity with its policy objec-
tives. The result of this construction shows that the Court of
Justice will not allow the Member States to derogate from the
language of the Directive in fashioning their implementing leg-
islation.205 The Directive thus remains broad in scope, and
due to its lower thresholds, also covers a much greater seg-
ment of the employee population than does the U.S. statute.
1. Part-Time and Temporary Workers
One important difference between the Directive and
WARN is that WARN unconditionally excludes part-time work-
ers from its threshold.20 6 The Directive, on the other hand, is
203. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text (discussing faltering com-
pany exception and exception for unforeseen business circumstances).
204. See supra notes 139- 42 and accompanying text (discussing mitigation proce-
dures set forth in WARN).
205. See, e.g., Commission v. Belgium, Case 215/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1039, [1985]
3 C.M.L.R. 624 (discussing Court's strict construction of language of Directive); see
also supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing adherence of Court of Justice to
language of Directive).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988). Part-time employees may, however, seek a rem-
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silent with respect to part-time employees. Thus, the rights of
part-time workers are determined by national law. The Court
of Justice's attitude remains unknown. °7
Temporary employees are also treated somewhat differ-
ently under the two pieces of legislation. Employees who are
hired solely for the duration of a contract or for the perform-
ance of a specific task can invoke the protection of neither the
Directive nor WARN when they are dismissed upon comple-
tion of the project. The Directive, however, will protect these
temporary employees if they are dismissed before the project
is completed.2 °8 WARN, in contrast, unconditionally deems
these employees to be "temporary" workers and grants them
no protection whatsoever.20 9
2. The Practical Effects of the Directive and WARN
Another divergence in scope results from the practical ef-
fect that the Directive and WARN have on their respective soci-
eties. At the time WARN was enacted, it covered only 2 per-
cent of U.S. businesses, and less than half of the U.S. work
edy under WARN if they can show that they were "affected" by the dismissal. See
supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing part-time employees).
207. The Commission has proposed a directive to deal with temporary and or
part-time employees. Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Rela-
tionships with Regard to Working Conditions, O.J. C 224/4 (1990). This proposal
essentially requires that temporary and part-time employees be treated in the same
manner as are full-time employees. Id. Specifically, the proposed directive guaran-
tees access to vocational training for temporary and part-time employees. Id. art.
2(1), at 5. It also provides that the employees covered by the proposal will be in-
cluded in calculating the threshold which national provisions require for the setting
up of workers' representative bodies. Id. art. 2(3). Further, the proposal insures that
covered employees enjoy the same treatment as full-time workers as regards employ-
ment benefits and social services. Id. arts. 3, 4. Arguably, then, part-time and tempo-
rary workers will be included in the calculation of the threshold of the Directive
under articles 2(2) and 4 of the proposed directive, should the proposal ultimately be
adopted by the Council of Ministers.
208. Council Directive No. 75/129, art. l(2)(a), O.J. L 48/29, at 29 (1975).
209. 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(c) (1991). The ability of temporary workers to bring suit
under WARN is further limited by the regulations promulgated by the Department of
Labor. Id. No notice is required prior to closing a temporary facility as long as the
employees clearly understood at the time that they were hired that their employment
was only to be temporary. Id. § 639.5(c)(2). The regulations further provide that
temporary employees may not be included in determining whether plant closing or
mass layoff thresholds are reached. Id. § 639.6(b). Such workers, however, are enti-
tled to notice. Id. Seasonal employees are exempt, unless an employer has perma-
nent employees that work on a variety of tasks throughout the year. Id. § 639.5(c)(3).
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force.2 10 That the application of WARN is so narrow is not sur-
prising.2 " It suffered nearly fifteen years of heated congres-
sional debate and modification. 1 2 Undoubtedly, Congress ul-
timately chose the threshold of 100 employees because of its
capacity to pacify the opponents as well as satisfy the propo-
nents of the bill, rather than its ability to avert or assuage the
harmful effects of mass lay-offs on society.21 3
WARN does, however, encourage employers to comply
with the notice provision in situations where the statute itself
does not apply. 214 Some states have attempted to fill the gaps
that WARN creates by establishing their own programs for
dealing with unannounced plant closures.2 ' 5 These programs
are aimed primarily at assisting dislocated workers to find jobs
or additional training. 216 These programs do not, however,
210. U.S. GEN. ACCOUrTING OFFICE, HRD 90-3, DISLOCATED WORKERS: LABOR-
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES ENHANCE REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 36 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter GAO REPORT]. The GAO REPORT disclosed that approximately 44 percent of all
U.S. workers were employed in establishments of more than 100 employees. Id.
211. 134 CONG. REC. 8903 (1988). Even the proponents of WARN recognized
that it would be narrowly applicable. Senator Sanford stated that "[ilt is a shame that
this provision is being so hotly challenged by the President. It affects a very small
percentage of U.S. firms .... The measure contains a very broad escape clause for
faltering companies and for unforeseen circumstances." Id. (statement of Sen. San-
ford).
212. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional
debate over terms of WARN and its predecessors).
213. See supra notes 102-04 (discussing views or proponents and opponents); see
also 134 CONG. REC. 19,858 (1988) (statement of Rep. Clay outlining modifications
made to bill in appeal to its opponents); id. at 17,875 (statement of Rep. Bereuter
changing his view toward bill after provisions were weakened).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988).
215. See GAO REPORT, supra note 210, apps. I-IV (indicating that Idaho, Ver-
mont, Michigan, and New Jersey have such programs.) Id. These programs attempt
to utilize committees composed of labor, management, and a neutral third party to
address the needs of workers dislocated by plant closings and layoffs. Id. The com-
mittees gather information on worker skills and interests, and use the information to
match jobs and training to individuals. Id. at 3. The committees also work with ser-
vice providers to determine when and where services are needed, and to monitor the
success of individuals in finding employment. Id. When employees encounter diffi-
culties in finding employment, the committees intervene to expand or add services,
and speed up worker enrollment in training. Id. The report discloses that these pro-
grams have been largely successful. Id. at 78; see also MASS. GEN. L. ch. 6, § 190
(1986) (setting forth duties of Massachusetts Industrial Advisory Board, comprised of
two representatives of labor and business, one professional economist, one finance
expert, and one representative of local government, with secretary of economic af-
fairs and secretary of labor as co-chairmen).
216. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 210, at 78.
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purport to intervene in the employer's decision to effectuate a
mass dismissal.
The Community, on the other hand, is committed to pre-
serving the Directive's goal of reducing the number of abruptly
displaced workers. The thresholds of the Directive are much
lower than those of WARN. In addition, the Directive ex-
pressly allows Member States to implement its provisions by
means of legislation that is more favorable to employees than
those that are required by the Directive itself.217 Many Mem-
ber States have done S0218 with the overall effect of enhanced
work-place security.
C. Supplemental Legislation
An examination of the supplemental legislation of the EC
and the United States further demonstrates the greater effec-
tiveness of the Directive. The Directive and WARN occupy dif-
ferent positions within their respective spheres of EC and U.S.
social policies. In the EC, the Directive is one of several direc-
tives aimed at harmonizing and enhancing the work-place
rights of Member States' employees. This results in a system
of legislation in which each piece is designed to intertwine and
supplement another. In the United States, however, WARN
stands virtually alone in protecting the work-place rights of
employees. The United States does not have a comprehensive
system of legislation aimed at enhancing job security.
1. Supplemental Legislation in the EC
The treatment of insolvent employers by the EC and the
United States demonstrates the contrasts between the two sys-
tems. The Directive expressly excludes from protection those
employees who lose their jobs as a result of the insolvency of
their employer. 219 As part of the Social Action Programme,2 2 0
however, the Community has adopted two other directives
aimed at protecting employees' work-place rights. The Insol-
217. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing Member State legisla-
tion).
218. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing laws of individual
Member States).
219. Council Directive No. 75/129, Oj. L 48/29 (1975).
220. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing directives enacted
under Social Action Programme).
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vency Directive protects the employees of insolvent employ-
ers,22' by requiring that the Member States establish institu-
tions responsible for ensuring the payment of wages and other
benefits owed to the employees prior to the insolvency.222
The other directive, the Business Transfer Directive, en-
sures the continuity of employment in the event that an em-
ployer sells the business by requiring successor employers to
maintain the work force of their predecessors. 23 The sale of
an insolvent business is not considered a transfer or amalga-
mation under the Business Transfer Directive.224 Employers
who have had to suspend the payment of their debts due to
financial difficulties, however, cannot escape compliance with
the Business Transfer Directive.225 Where the business is sold
during a semi-insolvency proceeding, the new employer as-
sumes responsibility for paying all of the debts that his prede-
cessor had suspended. 2 6 This includes any payments owed to
the employees by their former employer. 27
Furthermore, the Business Transfer Directive prohibits
employers from executing a transfer or merger in order to jus-
tify a mass dismissal.22 8 Dismissals resulting from a transfer
that occurs for economic, technical, or organizational reasons,
however, are excluded. 22 9 This provision seems to give a suc-
cessor a free hand to dismiss the old work force, provided that
the new business is technically or economically different, or or-
ganized differently. If, however, the successor attempts such a
dismissal, the Directive on Collective Redundancies will be
triggered.2 30 The European worker, then, is broadly covered
by the interplay of these various social policy directives, as
221. Council Directive No. 80/987, O.J. L 283/23 (1980).
222. Id.
223. Business Transfer Directive, supra note 21, O.J. L 61/26 (1977); see Foren-
ingen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v. Danmols Inventar, Case 105/84, [1985] E.C.R.
2639, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 316 (discussing application of Business Transfer Directive).
224. Business Transfer Directive, supra note 21, art. 4, O.J. L 61/27, at 27
(1977).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. art. 4(1).
229. Id.
230. Council Directive No. 75/129, O.J. L 48/29 (1975). Assuming, of course,
that the employer employs enough workers to satisfy the relevant threshold numbers.
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some of the gaps left by one are filled by the provisions of an-
other.
2. Supplemental Legislation of the United States
WARN, in contrast, does not expressly excuse insolvent
employers from giving the mandatory sixty-day notice. Only
employers who show that the required notice would frustrate
their attempts to secure needed capital are exempt from giving
notice. 23' The Kayser-Roth court narrowed this exemption fur-
ther by determining that insolvency does not necessarily con-
stitute an unforeseeable circumstance. 212 Thus, where a busi-
ness is heading toward insolvency slowly enough for the em-
ployer to prepare for it, the employer falls within the scope of
WARN liability. Further, the Midwest Fasteners court found that
an insolvent business that had entered into negotiations to sell
the business did not come within the faltering company excep-
tion, as negotiating a sale is not equivalent to "actively seeking
capital." 2 3
Taken alone, this protection may seem contrary to the
anti-labor trend evident in the judicial interpretation of
WARN. Taken in the proper context, however, it is not so ben-
eficial. If WARN does not protect the employees of insolvent
employers, then they will not receive any protection because of
the continuing dearth of labor legislation with respect to con-
tinuity of work-place rights.
a. Supplemental Judicial Doctrines in the United States
In the United States, employees may utilize two methods
to protect the continuity of their employment in the event that
their employer sells or transfers the business. The most widely
used method is the collective bargaining contract. Under basic
principles of contract law, unions can negotiate for binding
231. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988); see Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, 748 F. Supp.
1276, 1285-88 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that employers must show why giving re-
quired notice would frustrate their efforts to secure needed capital).
232. Kayser-Roth, 748 F. Supp. 1276; see supra note 179 and accompanying text
(detailing court's rationale for holding Kayser-Roth liable.)
233. Local 397 v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 78 (D.N.J. 1990); see
supra note 188 and accompanying text (postulating that negotiating sale of business is
not "actively seeking capital").
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carry-over provisions in collective bargaining agreements. 34
Due to judicial determination that such provisions are unen-
forceable, however, successor employers are not required to
accept the substantive provisions of the predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 23 ' Nor are they required to main-
tain the predecessor's work force.236
234. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-48 (1964).
The successor, however, must agree to accept the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 549.
235. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 284 (1972).
236. Id. at 280; see Howard Johnson v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S.
249, 262 (1974). In Burns, Burns won a contract to supply security guards and con-
tinued to employ the guards of its predecessor. Bums, 406 U.S. at 274. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that although Burns may have a duty to bargain with the incum-
bent union, it had no duty to recognize the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment negotiated by the previous employer. Id. at 282-83. There are four seminal
Supreme Court cases that trace the debate as to whether collective bargaining agree-
ments should bind successors in the courts. In Wiley, the Court held that the terms of
the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement are binding on the successor
where the successor obtains the business through a merger. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550-
51. This was followed in 1972 by Burns, 406 U.S. 272. The Court distinguished Bums
from Wiley on the ground that Bums involved no dealings between the predecessor
and successor, whereas Wiley involved an asset merger. Id. at 286. Because the total-
ity of the circumstances did not show that Burns substantially continued the same
business as its predecessor, Wiley did not require Burns to give up its freedom to
negotiate its own agreement. Id. The Court attempted to clarify the extent to which
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement would be binding on a successor in
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. 249. In Howard Johnson, the Court distinguished Wiley and
Burns by explaining that a merger results in the complete disappearance of the for-
mer business. id. at 257. Further, the state law governing the merger specifically
held a successor liable for the obligations of its predecessor. Id. Thus, the successor
probably expected to be bound by the outstanding collective bargaining agreement.
Id. In Burns, however, the predecessor business did not cease to be a corporate en-
tity; it simply lost the contract. Id. The relevance of the continued existence of the
predecessor is the availability of the union to seek a remedy for a broken contract. Id.
In Howard Johnson, as in Burns, the predecessors remained viable entities with substan-
tial assets so they were capable of affording the union a remedy. Id. Thus, the Court
found no obligation on the part of the successor to recognize the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Id. at 262.
This led to the Supreme Court's most recent decision, Fall River Dyeing & Fin-
ishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). Fall River Dyeing was the successor to
Sterlingwale, a company that engaged in two processes of dyeing fabrics. Id. at 30.
Due to adverse economic conditions, the president of Sterlingwale was forced to liq-
uidate the company's inventory. Id. at 31. Seven months after Sterlingwale went out
of business, Fall River commenced a new dyeing business in Sterlingwale's old facili-
ties. Id. at 32. The employees were independently hired although many of them had
worked for Sterlingwale. Id. at 33. Furthermore, Fall River engaged in only one of
the two dyeing processes of Sterlingwale. Id. at 34. Nonetheless, the Fall River Court
found that Fall River had a duty to bargain with the union that had previously repre-
sented the Sterlingwale employees. Id. at 41. In so holding, the Court affirmed the
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In addition, where the purchase of assets leads to the ac-
quisition of the company, the employees may invoke the suc-
cessor liability doctrine. Like the Business Transfer Directive,
this judicially created doctrine purports to transfer the obliga-
tions of the predecessor to the successor.237 The case law in
the area of successor liability is, however, largely fact-specific,
and thus rather recondite in application. 238 As a result, em-
proposition set forth in Burns that although a successor employer has no duty to
assume the provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement, it does have
the duty to bargain with an incumbent union. Id. The Court, however, refused to
limit Burns to the narrow situation where a union is newly certified at the time the
employer changes. Id. Rather, Burns stands for a broader duty to bargain, which
includes the situation where unions are not newly elected but still enjoy a one year
rebuttable presumption of majority status. Id. The Fall River Court was careful to
point out, however, that the decision is not intended to interfere with "the rightful
prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses" as was estab-
lished in Wiley. Id. at 40 (citing Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549). Thus, the Court continued,
"to a substantial extent the applicability of Burns rests in the hands of the successor.
If the new employer makes a conscious decision to maintain generally the same busi-
ness and to hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor, then the bargain-
ing obligation of § 8(a)(5) is activated." Id. Because Burns, Wiley, Howard Johnson, and
Fall River remain good law, the successor liability doctrine is often difficult to apply.
237. Business Transfer Directive, supra note 21, OJ. L 61/26 (1977). The Busi-
ness Transfer Directive of the EC contains an interesting provision in comparison
with the successor liability doctrine's application to U.S. labor law. The Directive
requires that collective bargaining agreements between the predecessor and the
union be recognized by the successor. Id. art. 3(2), at 27. Article 3(2) states that
the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in
any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor
under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the collec-
tive agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective
agreement.
Id.
The Business Transfer Directive further provides that a transfer cannot consti-
tute the grounds for dismissal. 1d. art. 4(1). While successor liability may, in some
instances, preserve the continuity of employment from the predecessor to the succes-
sor, the doctrine in no way obliges the successor to recognize the terms of an out-
standing collective bargaining agreement. See supra note 236 and infra note 238 and
accompanying text (providing brief overview of development of successor liability
doctrine).
238. The successor liability doctrine evolved from Wiley, 376 U.S. 543, Burns,
406 U.S. 272, HowardJohnson, 417 U.S. 249, and Fall River, 482 U.S. 27. See supra
note 236 (outlining evolution of successor liability doctrine). This doctrine may not
only create a duty on a successor employer to bargain with the incumbent union, but
may also create an exception to the general proposition that collective bargaining
agreements are not binding on a successor employer. As the Court indicated in How-
ard Johnson, a successor employer will be bound by the terms of the former em-
ployer's contract if two conditions exist. 417 U.S. 249. First, the successor must
continue, essentially unchanged, the business of the predecessor. Id. at 259. This
"alter ego" will be found only in cases "involving a mere technical change in the
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ployees cannot be sure that the successor liability doctrine will
protect their rights.
b. Supplemental Legislation in the United States
The supplemental legislation of the United States pales in
comparison to the multi-faceted social program of the Com-
munity. Legislatively, WARN has only one federal counterpart.
In 1988, Congress enacted the Economic Dislocation and
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act ("EDWAA").2 9  The
EDWAA established an assistance program for dislocated
workers that provides them with training and employment
services.2 40 The EDWAA further encourages the establishment
of local labor-management committees. 24 1 These committees
support and encourage workers as they cope with job loss by
identifying local organizations able to provide assistance and
facilitate the development of assistance strategies tailored to
the needs of individual employees.242
The EDWAA and WARN suffer from the same inherent
weakness-the after-the-fact approach to worker assistance.
Before employees can benefit from the EDWAA, they must
have already lost theirjobs. The committees envisioned in the
EDWAA do not purport to ensure that employers comply with
WARN. They serve merely as employment agencies, and em-
structure or identity of the employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the
labor laws." Id. at 260 n.5. Second, the successor must expressly or impliedly as-
sume the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 262. This is consonant with basic
contract and labor law principles of freedom to bargain. See, e.g., Burns, 406 U.S. at
287-88 (stating that private bargaining under governmental supervision of procedure
alone, without any official compulsion over actual terms of contract, is fundamental
premise of federal labor laws). The successful invocation of the doctrine is clearly
dependent on the circumstances of each case. HowardJohnson, 417 U.S. at 256.
239. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 565(IV)(D) (1988).
240. GAO REPORT, supra note 210, at 11. The law provides funding for dislo-
cated workers. Id. In 1989, US$980 million was allotted, but only US$284 million
was appropriated to the fund. Id. The 1990 budget proposed US$400 million for the
programs. Id. EDWAA essentially shifts the responsibility for dislocated worker pro-
grams to local areas. Id. Most of the funds are distributed directly to local areas
according to a formula rather than by the governor. Id. Significant provisions of the
law provide for "the establishment of (1) state rapid response teams to offer workers
assistance before layoff, and (2) labor and management committees to facilitate this
assistance." Id.
241. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNrING OFFICE, T-HRD-91-19, ADVANCE NOTICE: PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 4 (1991).
242. Id.
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ployees remain faced with the threat of abruptly losing their
jobs. The United States simply does not have legislation
designed to aid employees before they lose their jobs. As
demonstrated by the European experience, labor-management
cooperation is an effective method to protect employees
before they lose their jobs.
CONCLUSION
The EC's method of providing employees with informa-
tion and guaranteeing them the right to be consulted before
management makes decisions affecting their employment sta-
tus far surpasses the compensatory method chosen by the
United States. The European system ensures that at the very
least employees are aware of situations that may affect their
employment status long before they are dismissed. The U.S.
system, on the other hand, basically offers monetary compen-
sation to an already dismissed employee. This monetary solu-
tion can neither compensate dismissed employees adequately
nor enhance job security. To elevate the U.S. social policy to
the level of that of the EC, Congress should strive to discour-
age employers from violating notice provisions while at the
same time enhance job security by creating a mandatory sys-
tem of worker participation in management decisions.
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